by cklaus on 9/7/13, 9:34 PM with 49 comments
by anologwintermut on 9/8/13, 3:48 AM
From the original paper by the Tor developers:
"A global passive adversary is the most commonly assumed threat when analyzing theoretical anonymity designs. But like all practical low-latency systems, Tor does not protect against such a strong adversary." --- Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a465464.pdf
by reirob on 9/8/13, 4:02 AM
So it is suggested to update to a newer version that uses EC, but we are not sure if EC is not breakable? Others ([1], [2]) suggest that RSA is more secure than EC!?
I wish that the security experts could give "clear" advise.
EDIT: Added proper links to sources suggesting RSA over EC.
[1] Bruce Schneider in http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-rema...
"Prefer symmetric cryptography over public-key cryptography. Prefer conventional discrete-log-based systems over elliptic-curve systems; the latter have constants that the NSA influences when they can."
[2] Fefe (it's in German) http://blog.fefe.de/?ts=acd52294
by m_ram on 9/8/13, 2:02 AM
by contingencies on 9/8/13, 3:41 AM
by eksith on 9/7/13, 10:14 PM
Of course that doesn't stop operators from simply downloading the latest package themselves from the Tor project or compiling from source.
by tptacek on 9/8/13, 2:27 PM
Wait, what?
by coopdog on 9/8/13, 1:19 AM
I honestly don't know the answer as I don't deal with Linux repo's much
by doomrobo on 9/8/13, 8:48 AM
by thingummywut on 9/8/13, 5:08 PM