by thetabyte on 4/30/13, 10:32 PM with 61 comments
by frisco on 5/1/13, 2:10 AM
I've been lurking on the bitcoin-dev list for a while to observe how they handle issues just like this. I'm confident that these problems will be transient.
by AnthonyMouse on 5/1/13, 5:45 AM
The real problem here is not that child pornographers would actually use bitcoin to distribute links, it's that assholes who want to damage bitcoin would put contraband in the blockchain in order to cause legal trouble for innocent users.
But I think that's a broader problem than just bitcoin. You can encode anything into anything. Take anything anyone else has posted and xor it with something you want to encode. The output will resemble garbage rather than either input. But now you can post the "garbage" and instructions on what to xor it with to allow anyone to recover your encoded message, and the poster of the other message becomes an unwilling participant in your encoding scheme. It clearly makes no sense to punish distributors of the original message just because the encoded message is contraband. Which doesn't mean there won't be laws that will punish it anyway, but that is the fight that needs to be won -- to not allow stupid laws that would punish innocent people.
by moxie on 5/1/13, 4:39 AM
by tyre on 5/1/13, 2:37 AM
Any information contained in those bytes is just that: information. What can you say in 20 bytes that can have permanent, material damage to human beings?
A wonderfully sensationalist title, but really nothing to back it up.
by TheEskimo on 5/1/13, 7:23 AM
What if someone manages to embed something very much like the EICER string[0] in it? How many people do you think would use the bitcoin client on windows if their AV automatically deleted the blockchain as it downloaded in a misguided attempt to protect them?
Of course, first we have to know if this is possible at all. Does anyone know if there's either a) 20 bytes with a very high AV detection rate or b) some way to embed more than 20 bytes in a row in the block chain?
by siculars on 5/1/13, 6:31 AM
by eurleif on 5/1/13, 5:12 AM
by rockyleal on 5/1/13, 2:28 AM
It is a problem that exists in a different layer than the currency, even if it is to some degree 'passed on' through the currency. Likewise, the solution (imho) lies in a different layer: detect a cp link in the blockchain? Great, take down the link, problem solved.
Just as it is not the fault of TCP/IP, or its 'downfall', that it is able to transmit 'evil data', it is not Bitcoin's fault what vandals sometimes write on it.
by dasil003 on 5/1/13, 6:50 AM
It's not practical to shut down everyone with a bitcoin database any more than it's practical to raid every server with wikileaks data. If they're going to declare this nuclear war on bitcoin it's not going to be on the basis of some piece of data which by the point it's in the blockchain is out of the bag anyway.
by tlrobinson on 5/1/13, 5:15 AM
Obviously that's absurd, but where do you draw the line? You need specialized software and the 32 byte transaction ID in order to extract the data.
What other permanent public records could be manipulated like this?
by andr3w321 on 5/1/13, 9:12 AM
~/.bitcoin/blocks $ ls | xargs strings -n 20 | tee ~/Downloads/hiddenblockchain.txt
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Original_Bitcoin_client/API_Calls...
Are they just sending coins to an invalid address (their string)?
by Xcelerate on 5/1/13, 2:28 AM
I mean, you can verify that you are who you say you are simply by using your private key to sign a message; I would think a comparable process would work for this.
EDIT: Facepalm; you're hashing the public key. You don't need to hide that. See my comment below.
by LAMike on 5/1/13, 3:48 AM
by ck2 on 5/1/13, 3:48 AM
Has spam appeared yet? Because you know that is next.
by scottmcleod on 5/1/13, 3:16 AM
by drivebyacct2 on 5/1/13, 6:37 AM