by ca98am79 on 4/10/25, 12:40 PM with 41 comments
by TimTheTinker on 4/10/25, 3:47 PM
You're trusting a third-party server with the plaintext of an actual secret. This violates nearly every principle of good modern security.
If the author had somehow built and documented (and proved) a true zero-trust model that enables this kind of interaction, then that might be cool. But that is not this. For all we know, the author (or an insider threat working at AWS) is collecting these passwords into a database for crackers to try first before proceeding to cracking password hashes.
There are so many other ways to do this. E2E encrypted messaging with disappearing messages (Signal) is the bare minimum. Keybase messages (also E2EE) are also a semi-decent option. 1Password password sharing is a decent usability step up from those. For all three of these options, barring a compromise of the (carefully guarded) process for shipping frontend code to users, the security design guarantees no visibility to a third party, and they have white papers that go into great depth to explain why.
by ziddoap on 4/10/25, 3:01 PM
When the use case comes up, I like to use https://github.com/pglombardo/PasswordPusher (online version here https://pwpush.com/). Which has generation, customizable # of visits, and a handful of other features.
by a3w on 4/10/25, 2:57 PM
by dgrin91 on 4/10/25, 3:32 PM
by yawndex on 4/10/25, 3:04 PM
by esafak on 4/10/25, 3:05 PM
by Minor49er on 4/10/25, 12:48 PM
by thom on 4/10/25, 3:02 PM
by motohagiography on 4/10/25, 3:21 PM
its like a vault secret without the authn friction.
by new_user_final on 4/10/25, 3:24 PM
by qntmfred on 4/10/25, 3:11 PM
by eigenvalue on 4/10/25, 2:02 PM
by matrixhelix on 4/10/25, 3:14 PM