by flexiondotorg on 2/20/24, 8:41 PM with 264 comments
by vmoore on 2/21/24, 7:20 AM
- Principle of least privilege.
- Zero Trust.
- Compartmentation.
- Hardened Operating Systems with no malware and strong endpoint defense.
- Firewalls that whitelist only your IP and disavow everything else.
- 2FA/MFA/Biometrics auth for everything.
- Defense in Depth.
- Use crytography tools vetted from the community surrounding it, and use tools which are battle hardened.
Modern computing is very leaky and every node is malicious. You need extreme vigilance to safeguard crypto.
Are people up to the task of doing all this?
I'm asking because I lost crypto before, and now I'm more resilient and have better security posture.
by codedokode on 2/20/24, 9:56 PM
The same should be at Google Play and Apple Store. Scam apps and sanctioned apps are regularly passing through reviews.
by codetrotter on 2/20/24, 9:14 PM
When I create a transaction with Electrum on my computer, I use a hardware wallet to sign the transaction. When I sign the transaction, the hardware wallet shows the amounts, and the output addresses.
But if my copy of Electrum was backdoored and smart about what it did, it could use an output address for the remaining amount that went to another wallet. And since I and most people mainly check the address we are sending to but don’t pay close attention to the change address, we could end up having our funds stolen that way.
I’ve been thinking about moving to a multisig setup instead, that would have multiple computers independently used for checking and signing the transactions.
So far I’ve been putting it off because a single wallet and being diligent about checking the output address that you send to seemed sufficient. But now I think moving to a multisig setup is something me and more people should do sooner rather than later.
by edent on 2/20/24, 9:08 PM
If you have the technical ability to create an app, you probably have the ability to upload something to /.well-known/ or to add a DNS TXT record.
That way the Snap store could say "This app came from this website."
OK, it doesn't help if someone goes to the trouble of registering a homograph address, but it would at least give normal users a chance to check out who the author is.
That seems to be how Flathub works. It shows a verified domain, or prominently says that it is a community released app.
by jstanley on 2/20/24, 9:12 PM
> it connects to some API at https://www.exchangerate-api.com/
This is not necessarily right. The exchangerate-api.com site is hosted behind Cloudflare, so I don't know where it's actually hosted, but the IP addresses shown in bandwhich could be unrelated.
You also said:
> Visiting one of those IPs redirects to https://www.exchangerate-api.com/
It is common for malicious sites to redirect to legitimate sites to help evade detection, so it is possible that exchangerate-api.com is an unrelated and legitimate site.
by gjsman-1000 on 2/20/24, 9:44 PM
The desktop on Linux has gone Flatpak.
If I'm running a server, why the heck would I trust Snap, a platform that until recently didn't even let me control updates, over Docker? If something goes wrong, who do I call? If I need a custom storage arrangement, who do I call? If I need a custom network arrangement, who do I call? If I need to scale up, who do I call? Why would I subject myself to this?
Is it IoT? Maybe it has a market there - but why doesn't it focus on being the best it can be, solely for that market, then?
One more note: Snap even allowing unapproved repackaging of apps was, in my opinion, a very bad idea in the first place. Case in point: Even the Snap homepage is advertising a community repackage of a password manager ("NordPass" - developer not verified). Why the heck should Snap be proud of that?
(Edit: Apparently NordPass's website does point to it - but the developer remains unverified. What's the point of verification...)
by neilv on 2/20/24, 9:22 PM
Sounds like assurances made by UX and Marketing, which engineering might've been able to tell them they can't make.
If it ends up costing them $490K plus legal fees, that's still a relatively inexpensive way to learn this lesson.
by rsynnott on 2/21/24, 2:57 AM
(Never understood why ‘be your own bank’ was meant to be at all appealing. Being a bank is terrible. And still realistically less risky than this sort of thing; apart from truly bizarre edge cases (see the Citi/Revlon drama), this sort of thing simply can’t happen.)
by ceejayoz on 2/20/24, 8:57 PM
by renewiltord on 2/20/24, 9:07 PM
by nntwozz on 2/20/24, 10:10 PM
He's around 75 and has known me for maybe 20 years, we're not close friends but we run into each other every now and then and he knows I work with IT; I'm about half his age.
Long story short, I find out he needs help to retrieve his bitcoin wallet because he's lost $300k. I spend an hour looking around his devices and find out he's been buying bitcoin from a young hip instagram lady in Florida.
Wait for it…
…they shared access to the wallet.
He had a chat log stretching back one year on whatsapp with her, he was now paying her smaller sums to cover the cost for some "hacker" to retrieve his wallet.
¯\_(ツ)_/¯
by hsbauauvhabzb on 2/20/24, 9:21 PM
That is such a poor attitude. Instead maybe hope that canonical may fix the lax vetting and security of their store, but to care directly about their reputation and not the user who was scammed due to their weak practices goes hand in hand with everything else I’ve seen from snap.
by philipwhiuk on 2/20/24, 11:36 PM
Case in point: https://www.web3isgoinggreat.com/?id=fixedfloat-hack
by Saris on 2/21/24, 12:50 AM
by nly on 2/21/24, 12:03 PM
Multiple laminated (real) paper wallets in a safety deposit box and multiple locations is the only way to go.
by achiang on 2/21/24, 5:09 AM
I agree with all the recommendations - add human gates. Yes, it's expensive, but still far cheaper than the unbounded reputational damage that just occurred around the untrustworthiness of the store (hi Amazon).
by kwar13 on 2/21/24, 5:10 AM
Crypto has a long way to go and some improvements are being made but it definitely is one of the main pain points.
by Pxtl on 2/20/24, 10:20 PM
when they said that these Snap packages were "safe" they probably meant from a "linux is secure" and "properly sandboxed" meaning, not "we've verified that this person isn't trying to scam you".
by upofadown on 2/21/24, 12:13 PM
* No way for anyone (user or store) to verify the identity of the publisher.
* User was not given enough understanding to be able to protect their Bitcoin identity (usability, identity backup).
* No way for anyone (user or store) to identify who had downloaded the malicious snap.
by DerekRodriguez on 2/21/24, 3:41 AM
by fuddle on 2/21/24, 4:10 AM
by lyu07282 on 2/20/24, 9:39 PM
by democracy on 2/21/24, 6:53 AM
by doubloon on 2/21/24, 1:00 AM
then tried to 'self checkout' the app store
"One of the goals is to automate the whole Snapcraft publishing and review pipeline so there’s fewer (expensive and slow) humans in the loop." (from op article).
automation should not replace human judgement, it should replace human drudgery.
by Devasta on 2/21/24, 12:27 AM
by shuntress on 2/20/24, 9:22 PM
by lxe on 2/20/24, 11:29 PM
by judith48 on 2/24/24, 10:45 PM
by redder23 on 2/20/24, 9:00 PM
by lobito14 on 2/21/24, 7:29 AM